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CASES NOTED
The present decision seems sound since the insured had ample op-
portunity to follow the mode of the policies to substitute his beneficiary.
It also seems indicative of a trend back toward requiring a closer ad-
herence to the steps outlined by the policy to effect the substitution.
TAXATION-ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT BASED
ON TAXPAYER'S RELIANCE UPON COMMISSIONER'S
RULINGS
Petitioner filed no gift tax return in 1938 relying on the "acquiescence"'
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that no duty to file existed. This
view was subsequently reaffirmed by the Commissioner's representative in
1941. In 1948, the petitioner's executor was apprised of a deficiency and
penalty for the calendar year 1938. Held, the Tax Court's ruling that the
estate was liable is reversed. The Commissioner is barred from assessing
this tax and penalty. Stockstrorn v. Cornm'r of Internal Revenue, 190 F.2d
283 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
The general rule is that the government is not bound by the statements,2
acts3 and erroneous regulations of its agents, 4 nor can their neglect or ac-
quiescence commit it to an erroneous interpretation of the law.5 A tax-
payer's claim of estoppel against the state" is most often denied by a finding
of an absence of authority in its agents7 or a lack of an essential element of
estoppel.8 The reluctance of the courts to allow estoppel against the gov-
ernment has been particularly notable in the collection and assessment
of revenues. Although estoppel has been invoked more frequently against
1. "The expression simply means the Commissioner does not intend to seek furtherjudicial review and is adopting the ruling as a precedent he will follow in other cases.
Thus taxpayers are assured they can rely upon it without danger of being forced to litigate
the same question in their own cases." Strockstrom v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 283 (note 1)
(D. C. Cir. 1951).
2. Searles Real Estate Trust v. Comm'r, 25 B.T.A. 1115 (1932); James Couzens,
11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
3. Niewaidomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
850 (1947); Wells v. Long, 68 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Idaho 1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 842
(9th Cir. 1947).
4. See Schaefer v. Helvering, 83 F.2d 317, 320, aff'd, 299 U.S. 171 (1936); 10A
MERTON, LAw Or FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 60.14 (Rev. ed. 1948).
5. Schafer v. Helvering, supra note 4.
6. It is essential to distinguish whether it is the government or the taxpayer who
assets estoppel since different rules apply. See Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax
Cases. 3 TAx L. REv. 71 (1947).
7. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940); Ritter v. United States 28 F.2d
265 (3d Cir. 1928).
8. Century Electric Co. v. United States, 75 F.2d 589 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 295
U. S. 766 (1935) (taxpayer not misled); fames Couzens, supra note 2 (no reliance) see
10A MERTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 60.13; Jones, Estoppel in Tax Litigation, 26 GEo.
L. 1. 868, at 871 (1938).
9. Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915 (D. C. Neb. 1944);
Branson v. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32 (U. S. 1873); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 1810).
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the sovereign in its proprietary and governmental functions,'" it has been
allowed only with great caution in tax cases." It has been intimated that
estoppel might prevail if proved.' 2 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
has been precluded from adopting inconsistent positions 3 and has been
held bound by misrepresentations of fact. 14  Estoppel does not seem to
be relied on in these situations, but rather the courts preclude the Commis-
sioner from "remount(ing) in midstream.""'
The instant decision' illustrates a less strict doctrine of estoppel termed
elsewhere quasi-estoppel' 7 or tax estoppel,' which seeks to assert general
equitable principles. The majority relied chiefly on four cases to sustain
its reasoning on the estoppel issue, two of which are not tax cases.'9 In the
third case Justice Cardozo expressed the doctrine of quasi-estoppel and
applied it against a taxpayer.20  The fourth case approved but applied
Cardozo's principle in reverse, i.e., against the government.21 There, a limit-
ing statute was allowed to bar the Commissioner from taxing an alien who
filed no return because his books and accounts were seized by the govern-
ment. In the present case no return was filed because of reliance on a ruling
and statements of the Commissioner's agents. In failing to distinguish be-
tween reliance and physical impossibility, the decision extends the doctrine
beyond the limits imposed by the Tax Court22 where it was restricted to
tax refunds. 23 The succinct dissent 24 adheres to this restricted concept
of estoppel. 25
10. Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); Utah Power & Light
v. United States, 230 Fed. 328 (8th Cir. 1915); United States v. Peck, 102 U.S.
64 (1880).
11. See James Couzens, supra note 2 at 1148. "... there is a necessity inherent
in its sovereign power of taxation which the doctrine of estoppel can resist in only the
most extraordinary case." Barnett Investment Co. v. Nee, 7 F. Supp. 81, 82 (W.D.
Mo. 1947).
12. See Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1930); Ritter v. United
States, supra note 7 at 267. But ef. Sugar Creek Goal & Mining Co. v. Comm'r, 31
B.T.A. 344 (1944) (mutual mistake of law).
13. (Having proceeded on one theory of taxation, the Commissioner shifts to an-
other.) Borg.Warner Corp. v. United States, 24 A.F.T.R. 1168,aff'd, 108 F.2d 424(7th Cir. 1939). Cf. W. H. Easley, 8 T.C. 153, 165 (1947); Ernest Strong, 7 T.C.
953, 957 (1946).
14. Borg-Varner Corp. v. United States, supra note 13 (taxpayer lulled into security);
Carter Music Co. v. Bass, 20 F.2d 390 (S.D. Tex. 1927) (closing agreement disregarded).
15. Atlas, supra note 6, at 87.
16. Stockstrom v. Comm'r, supra note 1.
17. Naumkeog Steam Cotton Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 126 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 749 (1933).
18. Atlas, supra note 6, at 87.
19. United States v. Peck, supra note 10 (citizen's contract frustrated by military);
Swains v. Seamens, 9 Wall, 254 (U.S. 1869) (bill to discharge mortgage).
20. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54 (1933).
21. Balken Nat. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 101 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1939).
22. See Sugar Creek Coal & Mining Co. v. Comm'r, supra note 12 at 347; Tide-
water Oil Co., 29 B.T.A. 1208, 1220 (1934).
23. 10A Merton, op. cit. subra note 4, § 60.01.
24. Stockstrom v. Comm'r, supra note 1 at 289.
25. Turks Head Cluh v. Broderick, 166 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1948); Elrod Slug
Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, supra note 9; Schafer v. Helvering, supra note 4; Searles
Real Estate Trust v. Comm'r, supra note 2; James Couzens, supra note 2.
CASES NOTED
The instant decision introduces a liberal concept into tax litigation
which makes a marked inroad against the former inviolablity of the sover-
eign's tax power. Taxpayers may now require a standard of conduct from
the government commensurate with that prevailing between man and man
by invoking estoppel.
WILLS - DIVORCE - IMPLIED REVOCATION
A wife divorced her spouse and secured a property settlement. She took
no steps to revoke an existing will and upon her death the ex-husband
petitioned for his legacy under the will. Held, divorce by the testatrix does
not impliedly revoke the will. Ireland v. Terwilliger, 54 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1951).
The English common law early recognized that certain changes in a
testator's circumstances would raise the presumption of an intent to revoke
an existing will. The English courts applied this presumption in cases of the
subsequent marriage of a femme sole' and of the subsequent marriage of a
man followed by birth of issue. 2 This was done even though such action
seemed to fly in the face of the English Statute of Frauds3 which said that
no devise would be revocable except one revoked by a subsequent instrument
or mutilated with animus revocandi. The death knell was sounded for the
doctrine of implied revocation by change of circumstances in the English
Wills Statute of 18371 which provided for revocation by subsequent marriage
and explicitly prohibited other forms of revocation. Divorce, as it is known
today, was not in the contemplation of the English courts of that time and
there were no cases deciding the effect of divorce on an existing will.5
The doctrine "of implied revocation of a will from a change in the
testator's circumstances has been widely accepted in the United States.6
Many states have embodied the common law concepts of it into statutes.7
Some of these statutes state specifically what circumstances will effect the
revocation,8 while others provide for implied revocation by operation of law
in addition to the prescribed methods of express revocation. A large number
1. Hodsden v. Lloyd, 2 Bro. C.C. 534, 29 Eng. 293 (1789).
2. Marston v. Roe, 8 A. & E. 14, 112 Eng. Rep. 742 (Ex. Ch. 1838).
3. 29 CAR. It, C. 3, § 6.
4. 7 Wm. IV & 1 VIcT., C. 26, § 20.
5. 1 PACE ON WILLS § 522 (3d ed. 1942); RE FEARN, WILLS AND ADIlNISTRATION
OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA (2d ed. 1946).
6. Cay v. Gay, 84 Ala. 38, 4 So. 42 (1888); Corker v. Corker, 87 Cal. 643, 25
Pac. 922 (1891); Herzog v. Trust Co. of Easton, 67 Fla. 54, 64 So. 426 (1914); Ellis
v. Darden, 86 Ga. 368, 12 S.E. 652 (1890); Hudnall v. 1Ham, 183 111. 486, 56 N.E.
172 (1899); Nutt v. Norton, 142 Mass. 242, 7 N.E. 720 (1886); Wirth v. Wirth, 149
Mich. 687, 113 N.W. 306 (1907); In re Estate of O'Connor, 191 Minn. 34, 253 N.W.
18 (1934); Hilton v. Johnson, 194 Miss. 671, 12 So.2d 524 (1943); Hoitt v. Hoitt,
63 N.H. 475, 3 At. 604 (1885); Hale v. Hale, 90 Va. 728, 19 S.E. 739 (1894); In re
Battis, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W. 9 (1910); in general, see Durfee, Revocation of Wills
by Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circumstances of the Testator, 40 Mica. L.
REv. 406 (1942).
7. See Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills, 14 IowA. L. REv. 283, at 290-308 (1929).
8. Id. at 306.
9. Ibid.
